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Motivation
• Cost growth evident in 
weapons programs
– $296 billion in 2008 
portfolio
– $135 billion since 2008
– $70 billion unexplained by 
quantity changes
• Pressure to rein in costs due to 
fiscal and political environment
• Decision-making regarding  
processes and incentives
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Process Drivers
• Evolutionary acquisition
– Each development cycle occurs at lower cost
– Increased number of development cycles contributes to 
potentially higher cost  
• Phase concurrency
– Concurrency might be used to regain schedule (e.g., between 
)development and production
– Concurrency introduces risk of rework and wasted production
• Uncertainty
– Technology immaturity poses cost growth risk
– Requirements volatility poses cost growth risk
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Incentive Drivers
• Cost-plus contracts
– Cost growth tends to be enabled
• Competition vs. non-competition
– Competition should incentivize cost performance
– Low bids are potentially incentivized by competition
• Incentives 
– Evidence shows award/incentive fees ineffective
– Recommendations for using fees include 
• Set base fee and tie overall fee to outcomes not time        ,  
• Using rollovers judiciously
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Organizational Simulation
• Simulation methodology 














• Tools for designing, testing, 
prototyping and experimenting 
with organizational systems
• AnyLogic implementation with 
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Process Model




















• Concurrency and 
uncertainty
• Contract renegotiations
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Actor Model
• Principal-agent model
– Government as principal
– Contractor as agent
A th i t t f th
C
C C
• re e n eres s o  e 







• Eventually extended to 
multi tier principal agent
CPrincipal‐to‐agent
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– Non-transparent
Incentive Model
• Agent has a utility U(w, a) from working for the principal
– w = payment
– a = effort
Reserve utility in case of no contract–       
• Payment each period
– x02 for low performance
– x12 for medium performance
– x22 for high performance
• Performance based on effort incorporating uncertainty   ,  
– P(ai) = Pj with probability pji
– Probabilities scaled so that lower efforts have higher probabilities 
Knowledge and Skills for Enterprise Transformation. 9
of low performance and vice-versa
Optimization
• Principal’s perspective
• Minimize expected payout
• Subject to
– Agent’s expected utility ≥ reservation utility
– Agent’s expected utility for high effort ≥ expected utility for low 
effort
Knowledge and Skills for Enterprise Transformation. 10
Cost-Plus
• Let T be total time for an acquisition phase, and let there be an 
estimate of time remaining at time t
• Agent’s progress each period goes toward completion time, and 
estimate of time remaining is updated
• Principal pays xi2 per period depending on performance level
• An initial cost estimate is provided, and is updated with actual cost 
incurred plus an estimate for the remaining phase duration
• Cost growth and incremental cost growth can be measured by the 
difference of the actual and the estimate at time t
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Fixed Price
• Assume Cobb-Douglas production function with 
increasing returns to scale
• Production efficiency is a function of effort, incorporating 
t i tuncer a n y
– α(ai) = αj with probability pji
• Agent selects level of effort to maximize expected gain        
– Price per unit multiplied by number of units less expected cost to 
agent based on production function
• Discussion
– Production efficiency of concern primarily to agent
– Principal concerned with schedule
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– Discounted cash flows and penalties
Simulation Implementation
• Agent determines 
effort




• Cost incurred updated
• Estimated time to 
completion updated Decision points
Activity 3










• New probabilities 
generated
C Behavioral interactions
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Probabilities
• Probabilities change at each period
• Random assignment
– Each probability is assigned a new value from the Uniform (0, 1) 
distribution subject to the earlier constraints,     
• Random addition
– Each probability is assigned a new value by adding a random 
amount to the previous value
– The new value is the probability multiplied by (1+rUnif(-1,1)), 
where r = 0.1
– This simulates a random walk process
– The same constraints are observed, as well as the constraint 
that probabilities are non-negative
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Experimental Example
Probability of performance
Low Effort High Effort  
Low Medium High Low Medium High
0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6
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Random Assignment
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Random Addition
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Equal Probabilities
Random Assignment Random Addition  
Original Equal Prob Original Equal Prob
Mean 177.3 185.3 169.5 175.9
Std. Dev. 61.2 60.7 76.0 47.2
• Random addition has a lower variance than random 
assignment due to the generally smaller changes in 
probabilities between periods
• This difference is smaller under the equal initial 
b biliti i th i l it hi b t ff tpro a es s nce ere s ess sw c ng e ween e or  
levels
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Discussion
• Combined process and incentive modeling
• Micro-economic and technical behavior models
• Contract structure
• Simulation needed due to complexity
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Current Research
• Scale up work with F-35 data and multi-tier principal-
agent network
• Enhance fixed cost model
• Experimentation with incentive structures, transfer points 
and process concurrency 
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